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ABSTRACT
The interconnected relationship between international human
rights law and international criminal law has long been an issue of
scholarship. This article examines the last decade of practice at the
International Criminal Court focusing on instances where the Court
has either invoked a human rights interpretation of governing
documents or rejected such an approach. The article concludes that
the application of human rights is unclear and is largely driven by
pragmatism rather than principle. Greater clarity, through a more
consistent and transparent theory of international criminal law
interpretation, is needed. In the meantime, the judges should remain
reluctant from too easily conflating the two fields of law because to
do so, at the expense of an accused, can undermine the very
principles upon which fair and legitimate criminal proceedings
operate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The development of international human rights law and the
development of international criminal law were both, to a great
extent, inspired by a desire to ensure that the acts that took place
under Nazi Germany could never happen again, or if they did happen,
a system would be in place to address them. 1 As such, both fields of
law largely share a considerable common base.2 Where human rights
obligations are directed towards State responsibility, international
criminal courts focus on individual criminal responsibility for specific
violations of international law. Although the international human
rights framework developed at a faster pace following the Second
World War, from the 1990s onwards the field of international
criminal law has grown significantly. Indeed, the international
community created modern international criminal tribunals, including
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)
and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), amongst others, 3 to
address serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.
Likewise, human rights bodies, such as regional human rights courts
in Africa, the Americas and Europe, continue to address issues
relating to international crimes and the responsibility of States. The
1. ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 13 (3d ed. 2014).
2. Id. See also William A. Schabas, Criminal Responsibility for Violations of Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT 281
(Janusz Symonides ed., Aldershot 2003).
3. Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (“ECCC”) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”) are other examples.
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two fields are therefore historically and presently linked. Indeed,
when looking at the jurisprudence of the international criminal
tribunals, it is clear that both the ICTY and ICTR have used human
rights law to assist in interpreting substantive law and procedure. 4 It
was therefore welcomed when the Rome Statute of the ICC included
a reference to “internationally recognized human rights” within its
Article 21(3) concerning the applicable law the judges should apply. 5
This provision seemed to reinforce the interconnected relationship
between international criminal law and international human rights
law.
Despite the numerous areas of overlap between international
criminal law and international human rights law, it is nonetheless
important to remember that the two fields are not the same and should
not be treated as such. 6 Not all human rights violations will constitute
crimes under international criminal law. Moreover, obligations under
international human rights law are directed at States, not individuals.
And, most importantly, where human rights norms and standards may
be interpreted expansively in order to achieve their stated goals of
broad protection, the principle of legality and the rights of an accused
in a criminal process largely dictate that criminal law be strictly
interpreted and in cases of ambiguity resolved in favour of an
accused. Furthermore, while the ICC certainly deals with serious
violations of human rights and human rights norms are listed as a
secondary source of applicable law under the Statute, 7 the Court was
never designed to operate as a human rights institution but rather as a
4. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, Judgment, ¶ 467 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 608-15 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000);
Prosecutor v. Dokmanovic, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, Decision on the Motion for Release
Decision by the Accused Slavo Dokmanović, ¶ 59-60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 22, 1997); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 9831010 (Dec. 3, 2003); Prosecutor v. Bikindi, No. ICTR-01-72, Judgment, ¶ 378-97 (Dec. 2,
2008); see also Cryer, supra note 1, at 10.
5. See, e.g., Mary Robinson, High Commissioner for Human Rights welcomes Sixtieth
Ratification of Statute of International Criminal Court. United Nations Press Release, (April
11, 2002), http://www.un.org/press/en/2002/HR4583.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/SXC3-PCHY]
(archived Feb. 27, 2018).
6. See Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 Leiden J.
of Int’l L. 925 (2008); Markus Benzing, The Complementarity Regime of the International
Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against
Impunity, 7 Max Planck Y.B. of United Nations L. 591 (2003).
7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 21, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90.
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criminal court. 8 This distinction is important and begs the questions:
to what extent has the ICC adopted an overtly human rights approach
to interpretation of its substantive and procedural provisions and does
it do so in a clear and principled manner?
Yet despite this important distinction, there has been a real fear
by those working within international criminal law that international
criminal institutions have been adopting “contradictory assumptions
and methods of reasoning” from criminal law and international
human rights law. 9 This amalgamation has manifested in internal
contradictions and potentially unfair practices. 10 After briefly
outlining the important distinctions between international human
rights law and international criminal law, this Article will delve into a
number of prominent instances where a human rights-based approach
to interpretation was either embraced or rejected by the Court. This
Article first highlights two examples in which ICC judges accord
human rights norms precedent over restraining principles of criminal
law, to the detriment of an accused. The examples were selected
because of their importance both substantively and procedurally. This
Article will go on to show that the picture is a complex one. Indeed, it
demonstrates that many of the ICC judges seem to be aware that the
Court cannot address all human rights issues, even if tangentially
related to a case before it. Explaining this view, this Article highlights
three prominent instances in which the Court has recognized a clear
distinction between its responsibilities and those of a human rights
body.
Drawing on these examples, the article shows that while the
Court rightly promotes human rights norms and standards, thus far, it
has, to a large extent, been reluctant to take on a broader human rights
mandate, at least when not directly related to the criminal process
against an accused. Overall, it is difficult to determine a clear pattern
8. For instance, the Appeals Chamber has taken note of the fact that during the drafting
of the Statute “many delegations believed that procedural fairness should not be a ground for
the purpose of defining complementarity.” See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Case No.
ICC-01/11-01/11-565, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Abdullah Al-Senussi against the
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 Entitled “Decision on the Admissibility
of the Case against Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 495 (July 24, 2014).
9. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 925; See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights and
International Criminal Law, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
11 (W.A. Schabas ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2016); see also Masha Fedorova & Göran
Sluiter, Human Rights as Minimum Standards in International Criminal Proceedings, 3 HUM.
RTS. AND INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 9 (2009).
10. See generally Robinson, supra note 6 .
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when the Court embraces human rights norms over restraining
principles of criminal law. It has done so rather inconsistently, though
some pragmatic and contextual explanations can be discerned from its
reasoning. This Article argues that in order to reaffirm its liberal
criminal justice approach, it should continue to avoid taking on a
broader human rights mandate, particularly when to the detriment of
the accused, if it wishes to avoid what Robinson coined as an
“identity crisis” in the years to come.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND BODIES
From the Second World War onwards, there has been a
proliferation of international human rights instruments and bodies
established for the protection human rights. Of the nine core
international
human
rights
treaties,
there
are
ten
mechanisms/committees set up to monitor human rights protection at
the domestic level. 11 In addition to the international human rights
treaty body regime, regional human rights bodies, most notably the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights provide another crucial layer of
protection for individual human rights.
Almost all of the respective human rights mechanisms
(excluding the Charter-based system which is not discussed in this
Article) adopt a distinct approach to legal interpretation characteristic
of human rights bodies. Using the Vienna Convention on the Law of
11. The nine core international human rights treaties and their corresponding treaty
bodies include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the
Human Rights Committee (“HRC”), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (“ICESCR”) and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”),
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”) and the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”) and the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (“CtDAW”), the Convention against Torture
(“CAT”) and the Committee against Torture (“CtAT”) as well as the Subcommittee on the
Prevention against Torture (“SPT”), The Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) and
the Committee on the Rights of the Child (“CtRC”), Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers (“CPRMW”) and the Committee on Migrant Workers
(“CMW”), Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
(“CPED”) and the Committee on Enforced Disappearances (“CED”), and Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”) and the Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (“CtRPD”).
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Treaties, 12 and the interpretative methods provided under their
respective treaties, judges and commissioners operating within human
rights courts or bodies have developed a number of overarching
approaches to interpretation. 13 First, human rights bodies
acknowledge the primacy of the texts of human rights treaties.14
Second, they often favour a teleological approach whereby they focus
on the object and purpose of the treaty, which in the case of human
rights is usually geared towards the protection of the rights of an
individual vis-à-vis a State. 15 As such, they have a tendency to
interpret rights in an expansive and progressive manner. 16 Indeed,
there are many instances in which human rights bodies have expressly
welcomed “liberal,” “broad,” “progressive,” and “dynamic”
interpretations of the law. 17 As noted by the former President of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Cecilia Medina, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights “does not see itself only as a
guardian of the individual interests of one victim, but as the custodian

12. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S 331.
13. D.L. SHELTON, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 110 (Edward Elgar ed., 2014); see also K. Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the
Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 905 (2009).
14. See Shelton, supra note 13, at 110.
15. Id. However, not all human rights bodies adopt a progressive interpretation approach
all the time. Many of the human rights bodies defer to less progressive methods on sensitive
issues. See e.g.,Hatton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36022/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 122 (2003)
(deferring to the margin of appreciation in the case of environmental human rights).
16. Shelton, supra note 13, at 110.
17. Robinson, supra note 6, at 933 n.30; HRC, Kim v. Republic of Korea,
Communication No. 1786/2008, Views 1 February 2013, CCPR/C/106/D/1786/2008,
Appendix V, ¶ 11 (‘the Committee should maintain its progressive approach’); HRC, A. v.
Australia, Communication No. 560/1993, Views 3 April 1997, A/52/40 (Vol. II), Annex VI,
sect. L. (at 125-46) (‘broadly and expansively’). In the Inter-American system, see for
example, Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of
Journalism, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 2 (1985), Separate Opinion of
Judge Rodolfo Piza, ¶ 6, 12 (‘necessity of a broad interpretation of the norms that it guarantees
and a restrictive interpretation of those that allow them to be limited’); Bámaca Velásquez v.
Guatemala, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70 (2000), separate judgement of Judge
Sergio Garcia Ramirez, ¶ 3 (‘progressive interpretation’, ‘guiding momentum of international
human rights law, which strives to take the real protection of human rights increasingly
further’). In the European system, see Report of the Commission, 1 June 1973, ECHR Series
B, No. 16 at 9 (the Convention is not to be narrowly interpreted having regard to the
sovereignty of states, but rather given a broad interpretation to protect rights effectively); East
African Asians v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R.2 (14 December 1973), ¶ 192-5;, Stafford
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 46295/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 68, (May 2002).
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of the public order created by the system.” 18 This, she says, reflects
the true sense of a human rights court. The express acceptance of
more progressive and dynamic interpretations of law by human rights
bodies, many of which are composed of human rights experts and not
necessarily judges, stands in contrast to accepted interpretative
methods largely associated with criminal law adjudication.
In the liberal model, because the State is viewed as substantially
more powerful than any of its citizens, and in order to protect the
rights of a citizen vis-à-vis the State, limits need to be placed on State
authority. The need for limits is particularly important in the field of
criminal law, where States exert the ultimate power over an
individual, namely the ability to detain or in some cases execute.
Because the individual being accused may be marginalized and
unpopular, criminal procedures adhering to strict standards of fair trial
and due process rights are designed to lessen the imbalance of power
and overcome stigma or bias against an accused. As such, liberal
systems “embrace restraints on its pursuit of societal aims out of
respect for the autonomy of the individuals who may be subject to the
system.” 19
Liberal criminal justice systems therefore rely on and employ
restraining principles in order to achieve accuracy and fairness in the
process. Robinson emphasizes three important liberal criminal justice
restraining principles that this article will also address: the principle
of personal culpability, the principle of legality and the principle of
fair labelling. The principle of personal culpability holds that
individuals are only accountable for their own conduct. The principle
requires a certain level of knowledge and intent in relation to the
prohibited conduct in order to meet the mens rea requirement of
culpability. 20 The principle of legality, or nullum crimen sine lege,
holds that definitions of crimes not be applied retroactively and be
strictly applied, so as to provide fair notice to individuals and restrain
18. C. Medina Quiroga, Column, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 35 Years,
7 NETH. Q. OF HUM. RTS. 118, 121 (2015).
19. Robinson, supra note 6, at 926.
20. See generally id; Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. (Čelebići), Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Judgement, ¶ 424 (Nov. 16, 1998); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 136137 (Paola Gaetana et al. eds., 2003); ICC Rome Statute Arts 30-33 A/CONF/183/9 (16 July
2002); Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, Unless Otherwise Provided’: Article 30 of the
ICC Statute and the Mental Element of Crimes under International Criminal Law, 3 J. OF
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 35 (2005); Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, The General Principles of the
International Criminal Law Set Out in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute, 2 J. OF
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 38, 44 (2004).
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any arbitrary abuse of power. 21 Finally, the principle of fair labelling
holds that the label of the offense should fairly and clearly express the
wrongdoing of the accused so that any conviction corresponds to the
wrongfulness of the act. In addition to these three important criminal
law principles that have been recognized by international criminal
courts, the principles of legal certainty and other fair trial rights are
also relevant. The principle of legal certainty is closely related to the
notion of predictability, the principle of legitimate expectation and the
rule of law. 22 The principle of legal certainty refers to the requirement
that legal rules be sufficiently clear and precise, and that situations
and legal relationships remain foreseeable. 23 Furthermore, there are a
number of fair trial rights that form the foundation of a liberal,
restraining system. This Article addresses three, which the author
views as particularly relevant in the case law of the ICC. These
include the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence,
the right to an expeditious trial, and the right to be tried by an
independent and impartial tribunal. 24
III. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The ICC is the only permanent international court with
jurisdiction to prosecute individuals believed to be responsible for the
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the
crime of aggression. 25 It has jurisdiction with respect to these crimes
after July 1, 2002, when the Rome Statute entered into force, or once
a State becomes a party to the Statute. 26 Presently, 123 States are
party to the Rome Statute. The Court does not exercise universal
jurisdiction. Rather, the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the nationals
or territories of the States Parties, States accepting jurisdiction on an
ad hoc basis, or when the Security Council acting pursuant to its

21. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 22, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90; Bruce Broomhall, Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 447, 450-51 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
22. JUHA RAITIO, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY IN EC LAW 127 (2003).
23. Id. at 126.
24. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, December 16, 1996,
999 U.N.T.S. 171; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 67, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
25. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90.
26. Id. art. 11.
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Chapter VII powers refers a situation to the Court. 27 Importantly, the
principle of complementarity directs the relationship between the
Court and States Parties. A case will only be admissible before the
ICC if a State is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out an
investigation or prosecution. 28 Hence, the Court is designed to
complement national prosecutions and is intended as a court of last
resort.
The Rome Statute explicitly refers to “human rights” three
times: Articles 21(3), 36(b)(ii) and 69(7). Article 21 refers to
“Applicable Law” and lays out the law that the Court should apply.
This includes the Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, as well as, where appropriate, applicable
treaties and principles of international law, and principles and rules of
law as interpreted in its previous decisions. Article 21(3) provides
additional guidance to the judges and requires that the application and
interpretation of law must be consistent with recognized human rights
standards. Article 36 concerns the qualifications, nomination and
election of judges and sub-section 3(b)(ii) requires that every
candidate have competence in relevant areas of international law such
as the law of human rights. Article 69(7) provides that evidence
obtained in violation of internationally recognized human rights, such
as through torture or other questionable methods, will not be
admissible if it could seriously damage the integrity of the
proceedings or such a violation would render it suspiciously
unreliable.
Of all three provisions, Article 21(3) is arguably the most
relevant to this inquiry as it pertains to statutory interpretation and
sources of law. At the Rome Conference, 29 the diplomatic conference
where the drafting of the Rome Statute took place, there was “virtual
unanimity” between the various delegations concerning the fact that
the judges’ interpretation of law would need to be “consistent with
internationally recognized human rights.” 30 McAuliffe de Guzman
27. Id. art. 12-13.
28. Id. art. 17. The principle of complementarity has proven contentious. See Michael A.
Newton, The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration? 8
SANTA CLARA J. OF INT’L L. 115, 135-36 (2010).
29. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (June 15-July 17, 1998).
30. Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, Article 21: Applicable Law, in COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES,
ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 701, 711 (Otto Trifferer, ed., 2d ed. 2008).
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and Arsanjani both hold the view that “although the original intention
behind Article 21(3) was to limit the discretion of the Court by
providing a ‘boundary’ within which interpretation and application of
the law could be undertaken, its actual affect may be to broaden
judicial competence.” 31 Similarly, William Schabas, has described
Article 21(3) as ensuring that “the Statute is full of promise for
innovative interpretation in future years.” 32 Some commentators view
it as the most important advancement contained in the Statute,33 and
others believe that it holds a hierarchical position such that all
applicable law is subject to internationally recognized human rights.34
There is ambiguity, however, about whether the provision is intended
to allow for expansive interpretations, particularly to the detriment of
an accused.
Generally, most of the Court’s jurisprudence “reflects the
significant distinction between regarding it [human rights law] as a
source of substantive law” versus as a general interpretative rule. 35
The Appeals Chamber has noted that it is an underlying rule of
interpretation applicable when considering other sources of law and
further noting that “article 21(3) of the Statute makes the
interpretation as well as the application of the law applicable under

31. Rebecca Young, Internationally Recognized Human Rights Before the International
Criminal Court, 60 INT’L AND COMP. Q. 189, 191 (2011) (citing Manoush H. Arsanjani, The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 Am. J. of Int’l L. 22, 28-29 (1993) and
McAuliffe de Guzman, supra note 30, at 712).
32. William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 93
(Cambridge University, 2d ed. 2004).
33. THE ADVOCACY PROJECT, ON THE RECORD: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(July 7, 1998), http://www.advocacynet.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Issue-13-ICC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F82V-YBCK] (archived Feb. 28, 2018).
34. Dapo Akande, Sources of International Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD COMPANION
TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 41, 47 (Oxford University Press 2009); Alain Pellet,
Applicable Law, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY VOL. II 1051, 1080-81 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., Oxford University Press
2002).
35. Young, supra note 31, at 200. The Pre-Trial Chambers have also viewed Article
21(3) as being a general principle of interpretation. See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case
No. ICC-01/04-01/07-257, Decision on the Joinder of the Cases against German Katanga and
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, at 7 (Mar. 10, 2008); Prosecutor v. German Katanga and Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-330, Decision on the Powers of the Pre-Trial
Chamber to Review Proprio Motu the Pretrial Detention of German Katanga, at 6 (Mar. 18
2008); Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/0401/07-474, Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim
at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ¶ 78 (May 15, 2008).
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the Statute subject to internationally recognized human rights.” 36 It
has further stated that “[h]uman rights underpin the Statute; every
aspect of it.” 37 Article 21(3) can therefore best be characterized as a
special rule of interpretation which, on occasion, has provided for
potentially expansive recourse to substantive human rights norms
accepted by the international community. Keeping this provision in
mind, the following sections highlight two instances where judges
have embraced a human rights approach to interpretation.
A. Human Rights at Play
There are, at least, two important areas were the ICC judges
have embraced a human rights-based approach to interpretation, the
first substantive and the second procedural. The first example has to
do with a specific decision in the Katanga and Ngudjolo case
pertaining to Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court.38 In this
case the Judges decided to re-characterize the facts almost six months
after the close of trial and after the accused had testified on his own
behalf, which resulted in a new mode of liability being applied to
convict the accused. 39 The second example relates to a multitude of
decisions by the Court relating to the procedural rights afforded to
victims participating in the criminal process. 40
36. Situation in the Dem. Rep. Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-168, Judgment on the
Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chambers I’s 31 March 2006
Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, ¶ 11 (July 13, 2006). See also Prosecutor v. Lubanga
Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-772, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant
to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ¶ 36 (Dec. 14, 2006). However, other
Chambers, have treated Article 21(3) as a “gap-filling” mechanism whereby it becomes a
substantive source of applicable law. Cf. Situation in the Dem. Rep. Congo, Case No. ICC01/04-101-tEN-Corr, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of
VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, ¶ 81 (Jan. 17, 2006), and
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶
44 (Mar. 4, 2009).
37. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-772, ¶ 37.
38. Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA,
Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing
the Charges against the Accused Persons (Nov. 21, 2012).
39. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3363, Judgment on the Appeal of
Mr. Germain Katanga against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 21 November 2012 entitled
“Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing
the charges against the accused persons,” ¶ 30, 33, 62 and 99 (Mar. 27, 2013).
40. See Section III.A.2 for specific examples.
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1. Katanga Case: Re-characterization of the Facts
In the Katanga and Ngudjolo case, prior to the cases being
separated, the Prosecutor originally charged Germain Katanga and
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui with three counts of crimes against humanity
and seven counts of war crimes allegedly committed during an attack
on Bogoro, a village in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
(“DRC”). Both men were accused under Article 25(3)(a) of having
committed the crimes through the mode of liability referred to as
“indirect co-perpetration.” As indirect co-perpetrators, the men
allegedly used hierarchical organizations, the Ituri Patriotic
Resistance Force (“FRPI”) and the Nationalist and Integrationist
Front (“FNI”), to carry out the crimes in accordance with their
common plan, namely to destroy Bogoro.
Nearly six months after the close of the trial, a majority of the
Trial Chamber, acting under Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the
Court, notified the parties and participants that it would likely change
Katanga’s mode of liability to “common purpose” liability under
Article 25(3)(d)(ii). Under Regulation 55, judges may make changes
to the legal charges or mode of liability alleged against an accused at
any stage of the trial as long as the change does not exceed the facts
and circumstances confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. As a result,
the Judges severed the two cases and acquitted Ngudjolo on
December 18, 2012. Part of their legal justification for their late
application of Regulation 55 rested on the fact that the Appeals
Chamber in the Lubanga case had previously held that “a principal
purpose of Regulation 55 is to close accountability gaps, a purpose
that is fully consistent with the Statute.” 41 The Trial Chamber then
went on to cite case law from the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECHR”) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights to justify its
finding that the rights of the accused were protected despite the late
application of this regulation and its expansive application. 42
Trial Chamber Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert disagreed
with the position taken by the majority and argued in a strongly
worded dissent that the majority had overstepped its position. She
argued that the majority created a new narrative of the case, which
41. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, ¶ 12; Katanga,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3363, ¶ 104.
42. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, ¶¶ 16-18, 22,
37, 43, 48.
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failed to reflect key distinctions made in the confirmation of charges
and at trial. The new narrative, she argued, presented a
“fundamentally different case” that the defense must answer. 43 She
also lamented that the majority added “significantly new elements”
and new factual allegations to what had been confirmed by the PreTrial Chamber, 44 and as such, exceeded the facts and circumstances
of what was included in the confirmation of charges decision. In her
view, months after the close of trial, Katanga now faced a completely
new case and the notice provided by the Trial Chamber was not
enough to protect his fair trial rights. She emphasized that the
appearance of bias was alarming, noting that:
[b]y having to formulate what can only be described as new
charges, the Majority finds itself in the uncomfortable position of
being accuser and judge at the same time. The fact that judges
have started these proceedings down a path so unclear that new
charges had to be formulated at the end of a trial, after all the
Prosecution’s evidence has been heard, inevitably creates an
appearance of bias. 45

She pleaded with the majority to refrain from considering any
changes to the mode of liability against Katanga and to proceed
immediately to render its final judgment based on the original set of
facts. Katanga’s defense team appealed the Trial Chamber’s decision
to re-characterize the facts, but a majority of the Appeals Chamber
did not find any error. 46 However, the Appeals Chamber did note that
the Trial Chamber’s decision lacked detail about the factual basis for
the new charges. 47
In its Judgment, the majority of the Trial Chamber did change
the mode of liability, convicting Katanga under the newly, recharacterized facts. As a result, Katanga was convicted of crimes on
the basis of an uncharged and un-litigated mode of liability that the
Trial Chamber first mentioned more than six months after the end of a
thirty-month trial. Once again, Judge Van den Wyngaert drafted a
strongly-worded dissent in which she detailed what she saw as the
errors committed by the majority and highlighted the fair trial
43. Id. ¶ 11 (Wyngaert, J., dissenting).
44. Id. ¶ 15 (Wyngaert, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at ¶ 39.
46. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3363, ¶ 7 (Tarfusser, J., dissenting).
Interestingly, in his dissent, Judge Tarfusser references European Court of Human Rights case
law to show a different reading would put into question the use of Regulation 55 in this case.
47. Id. at ¶ 102.
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violations that she saw to have taken place. Kevin John Heller, a
prominent international criminal law scholar, has referred to Judge
Van den Wyngaert’s dissent “as the lone bright spot in an otherwise
dismal case — one that has resulted in perhaps the most unfair
conviction in the history of international criminal law.” 48
The majority of the Trial Chamber’s interpretative approach in
determining that Regulation 55 was appropriate rested in part on the
argument that “a principal purpose of Regulation 55 is to close
accountability gaps,” which they viewed as fully consistent with the
Statute. 49 They came to this conclusion after briefly examining
relevant restraining principles of criminal law but choosing instead to
focus on the very broad notion of the importance of ending impunity
for crimes. 50 While the goal of ending impunity for crimes is certainly
affirmed in the Preamble to the Rome Statute, it arguably should not
be achieved at the cost of the liberal criminal justice system, which
emphasizes fair trial rights and restraining principles of law such as
legal certainty and legality, which are recognized in Article 67 of the
Statute. The Trial Chamber addressed issues of the appearance of
partiality, 51 the right to be informed, 52 the right to adequate time and
facilities, 53 the right from undue delay 54 and the right against selfincrimination (given that the accused had testified on his own behalf
prior to the re-characterization). 55For each fair trial right, the Court is
largely dismissive of concerns and attempts to back up its arguments
with human rights case law. 56
For instance, without the decision to apply Regulation 55,
Katanga would have arguably received his final judgment on
December 18, 2012, and he would likely have been acquitted. Instead,
his final judgment was handed down in March 2014 and he was
convicted. This long delay, during which he remained in detention,
was directly linked to Trial Chamber’s decision to apply Regulation
48. Kevin Jon Heller, Quote of the Day – Katanga Dissent, OPINIO JURIS (May 22, 2014,
7:20 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/05/22/quote-day-katanga-dissent/ [https://perma.cc/
AP7V-LU66] (archived Feb. 28, 2018).
49. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, ¶ 12; see also
Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3363, ¶¶ 73-87, 104.
50. See generally Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA.
51. Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.
52. Id. at ¶¶ 21-34.
53. Id. at ¶¶ 35-42.
54. Id. at ¶¶ 43-46.
55. Id. at ¶¶ 47-52.
56. See supra notes 51-55.
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55, yet, the majority easily concluded that the late application of the
re-characterization and the right to a trial without undue delay was not
violated. 57 In order to show that their interpretation was not
inconsistent with human rights norms the majority referenced case
law from regional human rights courts, namely the ECHR where they
argued that similar provisions were enacted in a late stage of trial,
namely the deliberation stage of the first-instance bench. 58 Judge Van
den Wyngaert aptly points out, however, that the majority uncritically
transplants the jurisprudence from one domain to the other without
taking into account the differences of both, which unnecessarily
conflates the two domains. 59 She rightly highlights that the majority
failed to acknowledge the differences from the context of the
European Court cases relied upon by the majority with how the
Katanga case had been conducted, including the extended length of
the trial. 60 For example, one of the main cases relied upon to justify
the late application of the Regulation is that of Pélissier and Sassi v.
France. 61 Though the majority recognizes that this case was “distinct
in nature” it nevertheless wholly adopts the reasoning without
detailing the differences of that distinct nature. 62
With regard to the right to be tried by an independent and
impartial tribunal, the majority does little more than recognize the
concern and then dismiss it. This fair trial principle implies that the
judges must be seen to be independent and impartial and while they
may exercise a truth-seeking role, they should be reluctant to play too
great a role in shaping the case. In this situation, the majority arguably
overstepped their role by formulating a new mode of liability so late
into the process; a mode of liability that arguably ensured the
conviction of the accused. 63 The ambivalence of the majority towards
relevant principles and fair trial rights in order to secure a conviction
indicates how a system that strives to be a model of liberal criminal
57. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, ¶ 46.
58. Id. ¶ 18.
59. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, ¶ 32
(Wyngaert, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at ¶ 96 (Wyngaert, J., dissenting).
61. Pélissier and Sassi v. France, 30 Eur. H. R. Rep. 715 (1999).
62. Id. In fact, Pélissier is a case about criminal bankruptcy by the forging of
commercial documents and fraud. The final sentence imposed was a suspended sentence of
eighteen months and a fine of FRF30,000, the then equivalent of approximately US$5,500.
63. Dov Jacobs, A Shifting Scale of Power: Who is in Charge of the Charges at the
International Criminal Court and the Uses of Regulation 18 (Grotius Centre for Int’l Legal
Stud., Working Paper 2013/004-ICL, 2011).
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justice has embraced illiberal and contradictory doctrines. 64 It affirms
what Amann refers to as the impartiality deficit of international
criminal institutions. 65 The impartiality deficit has to do with an
international criminal court’s compulsion to convict and downplay the
rights of the accused so as to fulfill its mandate of ending impunity
and providing justice to victims. 66 The following section addresses
how, in addition to this substantive issue, the conflation of the two
fields of law has manifested itself in the most adjudicated procedural
issue to arise at the Court: the issue of victim participation.
2. Victim Participation
In response to the harms suffered by victims of crimes falling
under the Court’s jurisdiction, the ICC became the first international
criminal tribunal to endorse victim participation in its proceedings. 67
The Rome Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (the “Rules”)
and Regulations of the Court, 68 provide victims with the right to
participate, other than as witnesses, in Court proceedings providing
their participation is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights
of an accused and a fair and impartial trial. 69 The procedural rights
afforded to victims have been heralded and praised by many
commentators. 70 However, the Judges continue to struggle to find the
64. See generally Robinson, supra note 6.
65. See generally Diane M. Amann, Impartiality Deficit and International Criminal
Judging, in ATROCITIES AND INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: BEYOND TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE 208, 209-11 (Edel Hughes et al., eds., 2007).
66. BRIANNE MCGONIGLE LEYH, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE? VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 348 (Intersentia 2011).
67. Id. at 225-331.
68. Although the Statute and Rules were largely drafted by state representatives, the
Regulations of the Court were drafted by the Judges and adopted at the 5th Plenary Session on
May 26, 2004. See Regulations of the Court, ICC-BD/01-01-04 (Fifth Plenary Session May
17-28, 2004).
69. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 68, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
70. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some
Preliminary Reflections, 10 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 144, 167-68 (1999); Silvia. A. Fernández de
Gurmendi, Definition of Victims and General Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 427, 427 (Roy S.
Lee et al. eds., 2001); Claude Jorda & Jérŏme de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the
Victims, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY
1387, 1390 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds., 2002); Emily Haslam, Victim Participation at the
International Criminal Court: A Triumph of Hope Over Experience?, in THE PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 315, 315 (Dominic
McGoldrick et al. eds., 2004).
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most appropriate way to afford victims participatory rights in the
proceedings without affecting the Court’s primary goals of
investigation, prosecution and punishment as well as without
adversely affecting the rights of the accused. 71 Thus, although the
victim participation scheme was a well-intentioned attempt to address
perceived shortcomings from previous international tribunals, its
application has, at times, challenged the liberal foundations of the
criminal process. 72 The most important provision providing for
participation is Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, which provides: 73
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court
shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and
considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be
appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial
to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and
impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the
legal representatives of the victims where the Court considers it
appropriate, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (RPE). 74 (Emphasis added).

Article 68(3) reproduces text found in Article 6(b) of the Declaration
of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power. 75 As often happens when language is adopted from General
Assembly declarations not meant for direct application, it is
inherently vague. 76 As a result of this vagueness, the Rules provide
for a number of more specific participatory rights, such as the right to
choose a legal representative. 77 The Rules also state that legal
71. See Leyh, supra note 66.
72. Id. at 127-128.
73. David Donat-Cattin, Article 68, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1275 (Otto
Triffterer, eds., 2d ed. 2008).
74. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 68, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
75. Article 6(b) of the Victims’ Declaration reads: “The responsiveness of judicial and
administrative processes to the needs of victims should be facilitated by: Allowing the views
and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of the
proceedings where their personal interests are affected, without prejudice to the accused and
consistent with the relevant national criminal justice system.” Declaration of Basic Principles
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, Access to justice and
fair treatment, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34/Access to justice and fair treatment (Nov. 29, 1985).
76. Brianne McGonigle-Leyh, Victim-Oriented Measures at International Criminal
Institutions: Participation and its Pitfalls, 12 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 375, 404 (2012).
77. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 90, ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 (Sep. 3-10,
2002).
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representatives may attend and participate in proceedings unless the
relevant Chamber believes their interventions should be confined to
written observations; they may be permitted to make opening and
closing statements, 78 present their views and concerns; 79 make
representations in writing to the Pre-Trial Chamber concerning a
request for the authorisation of an investigation; 80 submit
observations concerning challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or
the admissibility of a case; 81 request protective measures; 82 and apply
to the Court to question witnesses. 83 Their ability to participate is
directly related to their right to be informed about proceedings and
developments in a case pursuant to Rule 92. 84 In order to ensure the
fairness of proceedings, the prosecution and the defence have the
opportunity to reply to any oral or written observation submitted by
victims. 85
The substance and scope of many participatory rights are not
explicitly provided for in the governing documents. 86 Accordingly,
the various Chambers each have a wide discretion to decide upon the
proper modalities of participation. 87 This has not been an easy task.
To be sure, “[n]o single legal issue […] has garnered as much
attention as the manner in which the ICC judges have interpreted the
right of victims to participate in [the] proceedings.” 88 This Article is
not able to address all of the decisions and issues related to victim
participation. However, there are two decisions, one from the Pre78. Id. Rule 89, ¶ 1.
79. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 68, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90; Id. at Rule 89.
80. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 15, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90; ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 50, ¶ 3, ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1
(Sep. 3-10, 2002).
81. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 19, ¶ 3, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
82. Id. art. 68, ¶ 1 & art. 88, ¶ 1.
83. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 91, ¶ 3, ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 (Sep.
3-10, 2002).
84. Id. Rule 92, ¶ 5.
85. Id. Rule 91, ¶ 2.
86. See generally Court’s Revised Strategy in Relation to Victims, Assembly of State
Parties, 11th Session, ICC-ASP/11/38 (Nov. 5, 2012).
87. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 89, ¶ 1, ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 (Sep.
3-10, 2002) (“[T]he Chamber shall . . . specify the proceedings and manner in which
participation is considered appropriate. . . .”).
88. Christine H. Chung, Victims’ Participation at the International Criminal Court: Are
Concessions of the Court Clouding the Promise?, 6 NW. J. OF INT’L HUM. RTS. 459, 459
(2008).
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Trial and one from the Trial stage, that stand out due to their reliance
on human rights standards to support an expansive interpretation of
participatory rights for victims before the ICC.
Relying on human rights law notions, the Single Pre-Trial Judge
in Katanga and Ngudjolo adopted a broad interpretation of Article
68(3). Judge Sylvia Steiner found that victims have a core interest in
the determination of the facts, the identification of those responsible,
and the declaration of their responsibility. 89 She found that these
interests are found to be at the root of a well-established right to truth,
which is a right derived from the right to a remedy in human rights
law. 90 And, when the right to truth is satisfied through criminal
proceedings victims have a general interest in the outcome of the
proceedings because such proceedings bring clarity about what
happened and “close possible gaps between the factual findings
resulting from the criminal proceedings and the actual truth.” 91 The
issue of guilt or innocence, the Single Judge found, is inherently
linked to the right to truth and that the search for truth can only be
satisfied if those responsible are declared guilty and those not
responsible are acquitted so that the search for those who are
criminally liable can continue. 92 Moreover, she found that the
interests of victims go beyond the determination of what happened
and the identification of those responsible. The interests of victims
extend to securing a certain degree of punishment for those found
criminally responsible. 93 Thus, identification, prosecution and
punishment are all “at the root” of the right to justice for victims of
serious violations of human rights and are independent from an
interest in reparation. 94 Judge Steiner therefore concluded that victims
89. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-474, Decision on the Set of
Procedural Rules Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ¶
32 (May 13, 2008).
90. Id.
91. Id. ¶ 34.
92. Id. ¶¶ 35-36.
93. Id. ¶ 38.
94. Id. ¶ 39; see also Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-252, Decision on
Victims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to
a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ¶¶ 9-11 (Aug. 10, 2007). Similar to the Pre-Trial
Chamber in Katanga, the Pre-Trial Chamber in Abu Garda found that the personal interests of
victims may include (i) the right to truth, i.e., the desire to have a declaration of truth by a
competent body; (ii) the right to justice, i.e., their desire to identify, prosecute and punish those
responsible for their harm; and (iii) the right to reparation. See Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case
No. ICC-02/05-02/09-121, Decision on the 34 Applications for Participation at the Pre-Trial
Stage of the Case, ¶ 3 (Sept. 25, 2009).
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have a personal interest in the outcome of the pre-trial stage of a case
which determines whether there is sufficient evidence providing
substantial grounds to believe that the suspect(s) are responsible for
the crimes charged. 95
As a result, when carrying out an Article 68(3) determination,
the Single Judge concluded that those individuals who meet the
criteria of Rule 85 (defining who qualifies as a victim) and who are
granted victim status in the case will always have a personal interest
in participating in all pre-trial proceedings. 96 In other words, the
determinations of whether a victim’s personal interests are affected
were carried out, in the broadest of terms, with respect to all victims
collectively rather than on an individual basis. Furthermore, she found
that this assessment should be carried out in relation to all pre-trial
proceedings rather than in relation to specific proceedings arising
during the pre-trial stage or specific pieces of evidence. 97
This broad approach has also been followed in the Bemba pretrial stage, 98 and, to some extent, acknowledged in the Katanga and
Ngudjolo trial stage. 99 The benefit of such an approach is that it
relieves the Judges from making individual assessments throughout
the proceedings. The drawback of this approach is that it essentially
invalidates the personal interest precondition found in Article 68(3)
and makes their interests paramount to other considerations. Later
Chambers have further streamlined the process, allowing the Registry
or legal representatives for victims to vet individuals wanting victim
status rather than judges when they do not wish to speak directly in
proceedings. 100 Kendall and Nouwen argue this streamlining, based
initially on human rights norms, was done for practical purposes. 101

95. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-474, ¶ 43.
96. Id. ¶ 41-44.
97. Id. ¶ 45.
98. See generally Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-320, Fourth Decision
on Victims’ Participation (Dec. 12, 2008).
99. See generally Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG,
Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial (Jan. 22, 2010).
100. See generally Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11-498, Decision on
Victims’ Representation and Participation (Oct. 3, 2012); see also Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case
No. ICC-01/09-01/11-460 (Oct. 3, 2012); see also Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC01/04-02/06-449, Decision on Victims’ Participation in Trial Proceedings (Feb. 6, 2015).
101. Sara Kendall & Sarah Nouwen, Representational Practices at the International
Criminal Court: The Gap between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood, 76 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 235, 249, n.59 (2013).
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As with pre-trial proceedings, judges during trial proceedings
have also broadly interpreted statutory provisions to the benefit of
victim participants, which are, at times, detrimental to the accused. At
trial, questions surrounding the proper role of victims and the scope of
their participation arose early on in the Lubanga case.102 More
specifically, the issue of whether victims would be permitted to lead
and challenge evidence on the guilt of the accused at trial similar to
the prosecution was particularly contentious. 103 This issue was
especially delicate given that the drafting papers of the Rome Statue
indicate that no agreement could be reached by the drafters on the
matter and the Statute only acknowledges the rights of the parties, and
not the victim participants, to tender evidence and the Court to request
evidence. 104 Article 69(3) of the Rome Statute, which relates to
evidence, provides that: “The parties may submit evidence relevant to
the case, in accordance with article 64. The Court shall have the
authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers
necessary for the determination of the truth.” 105 The wording of
Article 69(3) is significant. The first part seems to implicitly
recognize the partiality and subjectivity of the adversarial parties in
that it only requires the presentation of their evidence to be relevant.
There is no requirement that their evidence assists the Court in
determining the truth. In contrast, the second part seems to recognize
the Court as an objective and impartial truth-seeker and implies that
the evidence it requests will (at least in the Judges’ view) aid in the
determination of the truth. Undeniably, the inclusion of the second
part of this provision was to ensure that the Court was not restricted in
its evaluation of a case to the extent that it could only review evidence
provided by the parties. 106 However, no one foresaw that this second
part would be used as the means through which victims would
regularly tender and elicit evidence—often on the guilt of the
accused.

102. See generally Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision
on victims’ participation (Jan. 18, 2008).
103. Id. ¶11-12 & ¶40.
104. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 69, ¶ 3, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
105. Id.
106. See Donald K. Piragoff & Hans-Jörg Behrens, Article 69 Evidence, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 889 (Otto
Triffterer, ed., 1999).

718

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:697

When this issue first arose in the Lubanga case, both the
prosecution and defence argued that victims did not have a right to
lead and challenge evidence. The defence argued that if the Court
were to grant victims the same rights as those traditionally reserved
for the parties, they would be violating the principle of equality of
arms and prejudicing the rights of the accused by having the defence
face two accusers.107 Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber held that
victims did, in fact, have the right to lead and challenge evidence.108
Although the Chamber noted that the primary responsibility for the
presentation and challenging of evidence lies with the parties, victims,
it concluded, should also be able to do so if it assists the Chamber in
the determination of the truth and if the Court has in some way
“requested” the evidence. 109 A majority of the Appeals Chamber
agreed. 110 Therefore, although Article 66(2) states that the onus is on
the prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused, the Appeals Chamber
concluded that Trial Chambers may permit victims to tender and elicit
evidence if it will assist in the determination of the truth and the Court
“requests” the evidence in accordance with Article 69(3). 111
Accordingly, Trial Chambers may consider the issue of the guilt of
the accused as a subject that affects the personal interests of victims
107. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1220, Defense Appeal
Against Trial Chamber I’s 18 January 2008 Decision on Victims’ Participation, ¶¶ 51-52 (Mar.
10, 2008).
108. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, Decision on
Victims’ Participation, ¶ 109 (Jan. 18, 2008).
109. Id. ¶ 108.
110. Disagreeing with the Appeals Chamber’s Judgment, Judge Pikis dissented, arguing
instead that according to the Statute and Rules victims can neither adduce evidence on the guilt
or innocence of the accused nor challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence. See
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case no. ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, Judgment on the Appeals of
the Prosecutor and the Defense against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation
of 18 January 2008, ¶¶ 4-6 (July 11, 2008) (Pikis, J., dissenting in part); Similarly, Judge
Kirsch, who also dissented from the judgment, and agreed with Judge Pikis on this point,
referred to Article 69(3), dealing with evidence at trial, to argue that the Statute is
unambiguous. Article 69(3) clearly states that “the parties may submit evidence relevant to the
case” and not by any other participant, such as the victims. See id. ¶¶ 21, 35-37.
111. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, ¶ 108; Prosecutor v. Katanga
and Ngudjolo, Case no. ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, Decision on the Modalities of Victim
Participation at Trial, ¶¶ 81-84 (Jan. 22, 2010); Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/0501/08-807-Corr, Corrigendum to Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Trial and on
86 Applications by Victims to Participate in the Proceedings, ¶¶ 29-37 (July 12, 2010);
Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-2288, Judgment on the
Appeal of Mr. Katanga against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 22 January 2010 Entitled
“Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial,” ¶¶ 37-40 (July 16, 2010); see
also Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, ¶ 94.
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and may authorise legal representatives to question witnesses on the
issue of guilt. 112
Chambers have approached this idea that victims’ evidence is
related to the broader purpose of the Court to determine the truth in
dramatically different ways. The Lubanga and Bemba Trial
Chambers, for example, have viewed the scope of participation
broadly. In this sense they regularly allowed victims’ legal
representatives to question witnesses on the guilt of the accused,
linking this right with helping the Court to determine the truth. 113
When questioning prosecution witnesses, legal representatives for
victims have not had to confine their questions to the context of
crimes, the harm suffered by their clients or reparation issues. Instead,
legal representatives often attempted to establish the guilt of the
accused, similar to the attempts of the prosecution.114 Legal
representatives of victims in Lubanga questioned a number of
witnesses about the funding of the UPC in an attempt to link Lubanga
to such financial support in order to help establish his role in the UPC
leadership structure. 115 In another instance, the legal representatives
of the victims asked questions of a witness, who worked with the
child protection unit of United Nations Mission for the Stabilization
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), about specific
contact she had with the accused and his knowledge of the use of
child soldiers in an attempt to establish his knowledge of the
crimes. 116
On the one hand, this approach acknowledges the partiality of
the victims and their desire, in this case, to have the accused
convicted. On the other hand, their interventions, unlike those of the
other parties, are linked with the notion of assisting the Court in
establishing the truth, which implies some sort of objectivity.
Moreover, this approach essentially allows for multiple accusers in
112. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2127, Decision on the
Manner of Questioning Witnesses by the Legal Representatives of Victims, ¶ 25 (September
16, 2009); see also Katanga and Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-2288, ¶ 48.
113. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2127, ¶ 27.
114. It was not necessary for the prosecution to show that Lubanga enlisted and
recruited child soldiers himself. Rather, he was found criminally responsible for being part of a
group that did. In other words, the prosecution needed to show that Lubanga was part of a
group of persons that had a “common plan.”
115. Transcript, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo (Feb. 12, 2009), at 73; Transcript,
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo (Mar. 24, 2009), at 83-88; Transcript, Prosecutor v. Lubanga
Dyilo (May 62009), 8-9; Transcript, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo (July 2, 2009), at 2.
116. Transcript, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo (July 9, 2009), at 24-25.
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the courtroom. Defence teams must be prepared to be confronted with
accusations not only from the prosecution but also from victims and,
to an extent, judges. Chung argues that the mere fact that the defence
teams must prepare to meet additional evidence risks prejudicing their
rights. 117 The effect of multiple accusers against an accused impacts
not only on the time and resources of defence counsel in having to
respond to multiple arguments but also could relieve part of the
burden of proof from the prosecution. There is a difference in the
judges exercising their power at the behest of victims versus
requesting certain evidence at their own initiative. When done
repeatedly at the victims’ request, judges can be seen as less
objective. Zappalà asks whether it is desirable for the prosecution’s
burden of proof to be shared by the prosecution, the victims and the
judges collectively. 118 It is certainly more difficult for the defence to
challenge evidence requested by the judges, who would undoubtedly
argue they are requesting the evidence as an impartial tribunal even
when on behalf of victims, than to challenge evidence requested by
the prosecution.
In both the Pre-Trial and Trial Chamber decisions on victim
participation discussed above, the judges have sought to expand the
participatory rights of victims by relying on an arguably
indeterminate human rights concept not found in the Statute, the right
to truth. 119 One of the major problems in international criminal law is
that judges relying upon the right to truth are doing so in such an
expansive manner. Expansive uses refer to the broad references to the
right to truth where they are not connected to any context, legal
doctrine or specific relationship between the victim and accused.120
These examples highlight situations where judges are less willing to
emphasize liberal values focused on the defendant (and his rights) to a
more victim-oriented focus. Such a shift has already occurred within
the human rights system (most notably in the Inter-American system),

117. Chung, supra note 88, at 519, n.242.
118. Salvatore Zappalá, The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused, 8 J. OF
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 137, 148 (2010).
119. See Brianne McGonigle Leyh, The Right to Truth in International Criminal
Proceedings: An Indeterminate Concept from Human Rights Law, in THE REALISATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: WHEN THEORY MEETS PRACTICE 293 (Yves Haeck et al., eds., Intersentia
2013).
120. J. Benton Heath, Human Dignity at Trial: Hard Cases and Broad Concepts in
International Criminal Law, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L. L. REV. 317, 323 (2012).

2018] HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

721

which, as set out above, has different focuses and purposes than the
ICC. 121
Looked at in isolation the various restraining principles and fair
trial rights affected by participation may not seem problematic, but it
is the combined effect of the edging away of these rights and values
that matters most. The edging away of liberal criminal law values is
alarming not least of which because international courts have already
witnessed the relaxing of procedural and evidentiary rules that
negatively affect the rights of an accused. However, despite the deemphasis on liberal values, there are a handful of instances where the
judges draw clear boundaries between international criminal law and
human rights law, suggesting a reluctance, at least in some instances,
by the Court to take on a more human rights-related role in general.
B. Reluctance by the Court to take on a More Human-Rights Related
Role
Though the Court is mindful of the importance that human rights
play in criminal proceedings more generally there have been some
important instances where it has been reluctant to embrace an overtly
human rights approach. Interestingly, in these instances, this
reluctance is generally not to the benefit of the accused or individual
(who is not a victim) requesting greater human rights considerations.
The following section will address three instances where the Court
has made clear the distinction between its role and the role of a
human rights court or mechanism. Importantly, these examples are
less directly related to the criminal charges of a specific individual.
The first concerns the situation in Libya and the Court’s attempts to
exert its jurisdiction. The second example concerns the situation in
the Katanga and Ngudjolo case when witnesses requested asylum in
the Netherlands, and the third example deals with the reparations
decision by the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga.
1. The Libya example
On February 26, 2011 the UN Security Council adopted
Resolution 1970 unanimously referring the situation in Libya to the

121. See Lucas Lixinski, Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights: Expansionism at the Service of Unity of International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 585
(2010).
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ICC. 122 Libya is not a party to the Rome Statute, 123 but the UN
Security Council referral allows the Court to exercise jurisdiction.124
In March of 2011, then ICC Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo,
opened an official investigation and soon afterwards announced that
his office identified widespread evidence of crimes against humanity
and war crimes. 125 The Prosecutor speedily sought and was granted
approval for arrest warrants for Libya’s former leader Muammar
Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam, and intelligence chief Abdullah
Senussi. It was later learned that Muammar Gaddafi died while in the
custody of rebel fighters, leaving only his son, Saif al-Islam, and
Senussi left to face charges before the ICC. 126 Libyans, however, felt
that these men should be tried in Libya by Libyans, which resulted in
the new Libyan government requesting permission to try the men
domestically. 127
Importantly, as mentioned above, the ICC is not designed to
replace national prosecutions. Rather, under the principle of
complementarity, it is intended to supplement or compliment national
jurisdictions. As such, the principle of complementarity rests on the
notion that national jurisdictions have the primary responsibility for
investigating and prosecuting serious crimes. 128 This primacy is
largely based on practical and pragmatic considerations since States
will often have better access to evidence and witnesses. Article 17 of
the Rome Statute deals with admissibility and provides that a case
will be inadmissible if a State is investigating or prosecuting the case
or has already done so, unless the State is unwilling or unable to

122. S.C. Res. 1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
123. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC Official Website, https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome
%20statute.aspx [https://perma.cc/UR4C-6HSB] (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
124. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13, ¶ b, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
125. See ICC Prosecutor to Open an Investigation in Libya, RELIEFWEB (Mar. 2, 2011),
//reliefweb.int/report/libya/icc-prosecutor-open-investigation-libya [https://perma.cc/9AHBF65Q] (archived Mar. 1, 2018).
126. Situation in Libya ICC-01/11, ICC Official Website, https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya
[https://perma.cc/4E25-46HU] (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
127. See generally Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi, ICC01/11-01/11-130-Red, Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya pursuant to Article
19 of the ICC Statute (May 1, 2012).
128. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Preamble, art. 1, art 17, ¶ 1(a),
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
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genuinely carry out proceedings. 129 Through its jurisprudence, the
Court has further found that the national proceedings must encompass
both the same person and conduct which are at issue before the
Court. 130 The “unwilling” element of Article 17 is largely subjective
and requires the Court to look at the motives of the State and whether
it is trying to shield the suspect from criminal prosecution. The Court
must assess whether the national proceedings are being conducted
independently or impartially or in a manner inconsistent with an
intent to bring the person concerned to justice. The “inability”
element of Article 17 is objective and provides, in part, that the State
must be able to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence to carry
out its proceedings. 131
In the case of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the Pre-Trial Chamber
concluded, and the Appeals Chamber agreed, that the Court had not
been provided with enough evidence to demonstrate that the Libyan
and the ICC investigations covered the same conduct and that Libya
was able to genuinely carry out an investigation against Gaddafi. 132
Specifically, the Court noted that Libya was unable to carry out
proceedings because it had not been able to provide Gaddafi with
defense counsel despite the fact that Libyan law guaranteed him
one. 133 In focusing on this point, the Court stressed that Libya was
unable to carry out proceedings against Gaddafi in compliance with
its national laws, namely the 2011 Libyan Constitutional Declaration,
ignoring international due process standards when assessing
admissibility under the Statute. 134
While unsuccessful with
129. Id. art. 17 (“The Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: [t]he case
is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”).
130. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2-US, Decision on the Prosecutor’s
Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 31 (Feb. 10, 2006).
131. See generally Sharon A. Willians & William A. Schabas, Article 17 Issues of
Admissibility, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY (2nd ed., 2008).
132. See generally Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi, ICC01/11-01/11-344-Red, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Saif al-Islam Gaddafi
(May 31, 2013); Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi, ICC-01/1101/11-387, Decision on the Request for Suspensive Effect and Related Issues, Appeals
Chamber, ¶¶ 135, 205 (July 18, 2013).
133. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-387, ¶¶ 212-14.
134. See The Principle of Complementarity in Practice, (ICC-OTP, Informal Expert
Paper No. ICC-01/04-01/07-1008-AnxA, Mar. 30, 2009); cf. Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow
Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due
Process, 17 CRIM. L. FORUM 255 (2006).
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regard to Saif al-Gaddafi, Libya was successful in arguing that it
could prosecute Sanussi domestically, 135 which his defence team
appealed based in part on the fact that his basic due process rights,
under international human rights standards, were not being met.
Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber upheld the earlier decision, which
again focused on domestic standards. 136 To counter defence
arguments that the Court should look into whether Libya was meeting
international human rights (fair trial) standards, the Appeals Chamber
went so far as to state, “Indeed, the Court was not established to be an
international court of human rights, sitting in judgment over domestic
legal systems to ensure that they are compliant with international
standards of human rights".” 137 This statement is telling of the
distinction the Court was willing to make in this situation between its
role and that of a human rights body.
Through its case law, the Court has indicated that international
fair trial considerations are not the focus of Article 17
determinations. 138 This is despite the fact that international human
rights standards are specifically mentioned in Article 21(3) and
“[h]uman rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it.” 139 This
reluctant approach has allowed the Court to provide greater leeway to
the domestic system and focus on its role as an anti-impunity
mechanism rather than a human rights court reviewing a State’s
domestic practices. In this regard, the Court seems to suggest that it is
important to give domestic judiciaries an opportunity, at least until it
becomes patently clear that violations of due process, rather than just
being worrying in themselves, call into question the very ability to
prosecute an accused. 140 Yet, if Libya did not meet that standard it is
hard to imagine what would. In the end, Libya never transferred
Gaddafi to the Court in The Hague. Instead, it carried on with its
135. See generally Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC01/11-01/11-466-Red, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Abdullah Al-Senussi
(Oct. 11, 2013).
136. Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11565, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Abdullah Al-Senussi against the Decision of Pre-Trial
Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled, “Decision on the admissibility of the case against
Abdullah Al-Senussi” (May 24, 2014).
137. Id. ¶ 219.
138. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-565, n.495.
139. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-772, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr
Thomas Lubanga Dylo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of
the Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ¶ 37 (Dec. 14, 2006).
140. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-565, ¶¶ 1-3.
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questionable domestic proceedings against both men, and ultimately
both were later sentenced to death. 141 One year later, however, in the
summer of 2016, it was reported in the media that the government
quashed his sentence, 142 and in 2017 he was released by the Zintan
militia. 143
2. Katanga Witnesses Example
The second example of reluctance to adopt an outright human
rights approach concerns a situation that arose with witnesses in the
Katanga and Ngudjolo case. Following an agreement between the
ICC and the DRC, in March 2011, Floribert Njabu, Pierre Celèstin
Mbodina Iribi and Sharif Manda Ndadza, three witnesses in the case,
were transferred from the DRC to the ICC to testify. 144 The three
witnesses were held at the ICC Detention Center because prior to
giving testimony in The Hague the three men had been in detention
(for over six years) in the DRC for their alleged role in the murder of
UN peacekeepers. 145 However, DRC officials never brought charges
against them in this regard. 146
While in the custody of the ICC, on May 12, 2011 the witnesses
requested asylum in the Netherlands, arguing they would face
persecution and safety risks, torture, ill treatment or even death if they
were sent back to prison in the DRC because they implicated the
current President of the DRC, Joseph Kabila, with their

141. Gaddafi’s Son Saif al-Islam Sentenced to Death, AL JAZEERA (July 28, 2015),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/gaddafi-son-saif-al-islam-libya-sentenced-death150728084429303.html [https://perma.cc/6HN5-BBND] (archived Mar. 1, 2018).
142. Chris Stephen, Gaddafi son Saif al-Islam “freed after death sentence quashed,”
THE GUARDIAN (July 7, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/07/gaddafi-sonsaif-al-islam-freed-after-death-sentence-quashed [https://perma.cc/BBF2-F79B] (archived
Mar. 1, 2018).
143. Chris Stephen, Gaddafi son Saif al-Islam freed by Libyan militia, THE GUARDIAN,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/11/gaddafi-son-saif-al-islam-freed-by-libyanmilitia [https://perma.cc/T2V9-YKQY] (archived Mar. 20, 2018).
144. Transfer of Detained Witnesses, ICC Standard Operating Procedure [Transfèrement
des Témoins Détenus, Procédure de Fonctionnement Standard], ICC-01/04-01/06-2732-ConfExp-Anxl (May 9, 2011).
145. Netherlands: Do not return ICC witnesses at risk of death penalty, ill-treatment
and unfair trials to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (June
30, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR35/001/2014/es/ [https://perma.cc/
5WMM-X39Q] (archived Mar. 20, 2018).
146. Id.
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testimonies. 147 On June 9, 2011, the Trial Chamber issued a decision
to delay the witnesses’ return to the DRC in compliance with Article
93(7)(b) of the Rome Statute, 148 holding that a return would violate,
according to Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, the Court’s
obligations to protect witnesses, the witnesses’ human right to apply
for asylum, the non-refoulement principle, and the right to an
effective remedy. 149 Importantly, in the Court’s view, however, the
Statute only requires the Court to protect witnesses from risks related
to their cooperation with the ICC. It does not imply a broader duty to
protect witnesses from the risk of persecution they may suffer once
they return home. 150
More specifically, the Trial Chamber found that the Court does
not have to apply the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits
the expulsion of refugees to places where their lives could be in
danger. 151 The Court emphasized that Article 21(3) “only requires the
Chambers to ensure that the Statute and other sources of law set forth
in Article 21(1) and 21(2) are applied in a manner which is not
inconsistent with or in violation of internationally recognised human
rights.” 152 As such, the Court held that it must enable the witnesses to
exercise their right to seek asylum by, for example, allowing the
witnesses to meet and correspond with their lawyers of choice so that
they can access asylum procedures. 153 For this purpose, it delayed the
return of the witnesses to the DRC but was reluctant to take on a
bigger role by accepting responsibility for their legal protection.
Initially, the Dutch authorities were critical of the actions of the
ICC, which essentially required the Dutch government to process the
asylum requests of the three witnesses. The Dutch authorities
147. See generally Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-2968, Request for Leave to
Submit Amicus Curiae Observations by Mr. Shuller and Mr. Sluiter, Council in Dutch Asylum
Proceedings of Witnesses DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228, DRC-D02-P-0350, Counsel
for Witnesses (May 25, 2011).
148. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 93, ¶ 7(b), July 17, 1998,
2187 (“A person thus transferred shall remain in custody and once the purposes of the transfer
have been fulfilled, the Court shall return the person without delay to the requested State.”).
149. Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3003-tENG, Decision on
an Amicus Curiae Application and on the ‘Requête tendant à obtenir présentations des témoins
DRC-D02-P-0350, DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228 aux autorités néerlandaises aux fins
d’asile’, ¶35 (June 9, 2011).
150. Id. ¶¶ 59-63.
151. In this sense, the ICC’s evaluation differs from the evaluation a State should make
in response to an asylum application. See id. ¶ 63.
152. Id. ¶ 62.
153. Id. ¶ 73.
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continuously sought to exempt the witnesses from the Dutch asylum
procedures, arguing, amongst other things, that the witnesses’
applications should be considered mere “requests for protection” over
which the Dutch Alien Act (Vreemdelingenwet) did not apply. 154
Instead, they sought to evaluate the witnesses’ requests on the basis of
a sui generis procedure whereby they would only determine whether
the non-refoulement principle obstructs the Netherlands from
excluding the witnesses from asylum. 155 However, in its decision of
December 28, 2011, the District Court of The Hague prevented the
Dutch authorities from pursuing this approach and determined that
neither Dutch immigration law nor the regulations concerning the
relations between the Netherlands and the ICC exempt the witnesses
from the regular asylum procedure. 156 Meanwhile, the Congolese
authorities were insisting on the return of the witnesses to the DRC
upon completion of their testimony. 157 As a result, the Court found
the situation problematic from a state cooperation standpoint.
In October 2012, the asylum applications of the witnesses were
denied by decisions from the Dutch Minister for Immigration,
Integration and Asylum under the application of Article 1(f) of the
Refugee Convention. 158 This provision provides that refugee status
cannot be granted when there are “serious reasons for considering”
that the applicant committed war crimes or crimes against humanity,
amongst other crimes. 159 But the question of whether they could be
returned, possibly in violation of the principle of non-refoulement was
still unanswered and the witnesses appealed the denial of asylum. On
June 4, 2014, after a number of legal pleadings and appeals, as well as
consultations between all parties involved, the witnesses were
transferred from the ICC Detention Center to the Dutch authorities.
At this point, the ICC was satisfied with the assurances provided by
154. Marjolein Cupido & Joris van Wijk, Testifying Behind Bars: Detained ICC
witnesses and Human Rights Protection, SSRN (Jan. 4, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2374678 [https://perma.cc/Z5ZC-DLRP] (archived Mar. 1, 2018).
155. Id. (citing Rechtbank Den Haag, § 8.2, Dec. 28, 2011).
156. Id. (citing Rechtbank Den Haag, § 9.9, Dec. 28, 2011).
157. See Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3405-tENG, Decision
on the Application for the Interim Release of Detained Witnesses DRCD02-P-0236, DRCD02-P-0228 and DRC-D02-P-0350, ¶19 (Oct. 1, 2013).
158. HR 4 April 2014, NJ 2014, 481 m.nt. (Neth.). All detainees were in the Detention
Centre of the International Criminal Court, Scheveningen, municipality of The Hague/The
State of the Netherlands.
159. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(F), July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
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the DRC to protect them if they would be returned, namely that no
death penalty would be imposed and that their cases would be added
to the roster for national proceedings. 160 Interestingly, no assurances
were provided by the DRC to the Netherlands itself. 161 On June 27,
2014, the Dutch Council of State denied the witnesses’ asylum
application confirming the applicability of the Article 1(f) exception
of the Refugee Convention. Its decision quashed an earlier
Amsterdam District Court’s decision from October 2013, stating that
they could not be sent back, and thus authorized their transfer back to
the DRC. 162 A short time later the witnesses were returned to
Kinshasa in the DRC. 163
The case presented a number of legal and human rights-related
questions for the Court to address. One such question is who was
responsible for the witnesses’ protection upon their return. Following
the agreement between the DRC and the ICC, the witnesses remained
under Congolese custody. The DRC repeatedly emphasized this point
when asking for the return of the witnesses. 164 However, in practice,
the DRC did not have effective control over the witnesses since they
were not present physically on its territory. The witnesses were
physically present in the Netherlands and, more specifically, on the
ICC’s premises. Thus, it could be argued that the ICC was the one
with effective control over them. However, according to Article 44 of
the Headquarters Agreement, the competent authorities at the Court’s
request shall carry out the transport of persons in custody of the
ICC. 165 Since the ICC is not a State, it does not have the means to
carry on any transfer on its own; it requires the cooperation of the
160. Press Release, ICC, ICC transfers three detained witnesses to Dutch custody (June
4, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/
pages/pr1010.aspx [https://perma.cc/7E5A-XNKK] (archived Mar. 1, 2018).
161. Letter from Richard Dicker, Director, International Justice Program, to Fred
Teeven, Secretary of State, The Netherlands, (Jul. 4, 2014) (on file with HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/04/letter-netherlands-state-secretary-securityand-justice-deportation-three-internatio [https://perma.cc/GVC6-SJVD] (archived Mar. 1,
2018).
162. Alien/The State of the Netherlands, Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the
Council of State [ARRvS][Afdeling Rechtspraak van de Raad van State], (27 June 2014)
201310217/1/V1 (Neth.).
163. Press Release, ICC, supra note 160.
164. Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-2952, Order to Provide
Further Assurances Regarding the Security of DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228 and DRCD02-P-0350, ¶ 1 (May 24, 2011).
165. Headquarters Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the Host
State, Mar. 1 2008, ICC‐BD/04‐01‐08.
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host State. Therefore, it appeared to be a situation of shared
responsibility. 166 However, throughout the long process, both the
Netherlands and the ICC tried to excuse themselves from the
responsibility of assessing the protection concerns raised by the
witnesses. 167
For its part, the Court found that unlike the Netherlands, which
is party to the ICCPR and the ECHR, the Court has a more restrictive
regime to act under. In other words, it does not work under a human
rights framework as a State would. Evidence of this restrictive
approach is the Trial Chamber’s decision of August 24, 2011 stating
that the requirements of Article 68 of the Rome Statute, dealing with
protection of witnesses, were limited to risks related to the
cooperation of the witnesses with the ICC. 168 Thus, the Trial
Chamber concluded it could not take any position regarding the
potential violation of the witnesses’ human rights or alleged
persecution by the DRC authorities. 169 However, this interpretation of
Article 68 is not so clear cut.
The International Court of Justice has established in one of its
advisory opinions that “international organizations are subjects of
international law, and as such, are bound by any obligations
incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under
their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are
parties.” 170 The principle of non-refoulement would arguably apply to
international organisations such as the ICC. Moreover, Article 57 of
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 171 enacted by the
International Law Commission (“ILC”), recognizes that international
organisations may be held internationally responsible, further
supporting the notion that international organisations have a duty to
respect international obligations such as the principle of nonrefoulement. 172 The international responsibility of international
organisations can also be found in the Draft Articles on the
166. Göran Sluiter, Shared Responsibility in International Criminal Justice, the ICC and
Asylum, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 661, 671 (2012).
167. Cupido & Wijk, supra note 154; Sluiter, supra note 166, at 661.
168. Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3128, Decision on the Security Situation
or Witness DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228 and DRC-D02-P-0350, ¶14 (May. 24, 2011).
169. Id.
170. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt,
International Court of Justice (Dec. 20, 1980), at 73.
171. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
International Law Commission (Supplement No. 10, A/56/10, November 2001).
172. Id.
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Responsibility of International Organizations (“DARIO”) 173 enacted
by the ILC in 2011. The DARIO acknowledge that every action or
omission attributable to a certain organisation under international law
that constitutes a breach of an international obligation entails the
international responsibility of that organisation. 174 While the
application of the principle of non-refoulement to the ICC is not
straight forward the Judges shied away from addressing its own
institutional role.
In its decision, the Appeals Chamber did not take into account
the fact that the obligation underlying the non-refoulement principle
is absolute. 175 Rather than address the absolute prohibition under
human rights law, it instead choose to confine itself to its State
cooperation obligations under Article 93(7). While behind the scenes
the Court was working to gain protection assurances from the DRC in
order to secure some human rights for the witnesses, its official
position maintained that the Statute does not impose on the Court the
obligation to protect witnesses from human rights violations that do
not derive from their participation before the Court. Its assessment of
whether there was a link between the potential risk that the witnesses
faced upon return and their testimony before the ICC was generally
narrower than one that might be applied by a human rights body
considering a question of non-refoulement. 176 The existence of a
context of gross human rights violations in the DRC detention
centers, their illegal detention prior to their transfer to the ICC and the
content of their testimony are all important factors that were not given
much weight by the Court.

173. The D.A.R.I.O. were adopted by the International Law Commission at its sixtythird session, in 2011, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s
report covering the work of that session. See Draft Article on the Responsibilities of
International Organizations, International Law Commission (A/66/10, 2011), ¶ 87.
174. Draft Article on the Responsibilities of International Organizations arts. 3, 4,
International Law Commission (A/66/10, 2011).
175. See generally Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, ICC.01/04-02/12-158, Order on the
Implementation of the Cooperation Agreement between the Court and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo Concluded pursuant to Article 93(7) of the Statute (January 20, 2014).
176. The Committee Against Torture, for example, established in its General Comment
No. 1 that, when assessing if an individual would be in danger of being subjected to torture, it
would take into account “[I]f the author engaged in political or other activity within or outside
the State concerned which would appear to make him/her particularly vulnerable to the risk of
being placed in danger of torture were he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited to the state
in question.” See Committee Against Torture, U.N. Doc. A/53/44, at 52 (1998).
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In this specific case, the witnesses implicated the President of
the DRC in their testimonies. Such actions arguably made them
particularly vulnerable to the risk of torture or ill treatment on their
return. The position of the Appeals Chamber in this situation seems to
stand in stark contrast to statements in the Lubanga case where it held
that “human rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it, including
the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court. Its provisions must be
interpreted and more importantly applied in accordance with
internationally recognised human rights.” 177 The internal incoherence
is striking. The position of the Court in this situation seems to suggest
that it may only officially be interested in human rights norms that
affect some individuals, such as victims and accused. Whereas the
rights of other individuals, such as witnesses, may be of a lower
priority. This is not to say that the Court had the power or capacity to
take decisive action. However, as with many human rights bodies,
this is also the case. Nevertheless, the Court had the opportunity to
pronounce upon the principle of non-refoulement and its institutional
role vis-à-vis the individuals, including their testimony and their
concerns about returning to the DRC.
3. Reparations Decisions
The third, and final, example of where the Court has shown
reluctance to adopt a broader human rights approach has to do with
the Appeals Chamber judgment on reparations in the Lubanga case.
On March 3, 2015 the Appeals Chamber handed down its muchawaited judgment on the appeal against the Lubanga Trial Chamber
“Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to
reparations.” 178 The Appeals Chamber noted the errors and
shortcomings of the Trial Chamber’s decision and clarified how Trial
Chambers should approach reparations decisions in the future. The
Appeals Chamber refrained from adopting too broad a mandate with
regard to reparations. 179
177. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC- 01/04-01/06-772, Judgment on the Appeal of
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction
of the Court Pursuant to Article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ¶37 (Dec. 14,
2006).
178. See generally Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-3129, Judgment on
the Appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to
reparations” of 7 August 2012 with Amended Order for Reparations (Annex A) and Public
Annexes 1 and 2 (Mar. 3, 2015).
179. Id. ¶ 212.
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In its Judgment, the Appeals Chamber laid out five general
elements that all orders for reparations must include: (1) an order for
reparations must be made against the convicted person; (2) the order
must establish and inform the convicted person of his or her liability;
(3) the order must specify the type of reparations that are to be
awarded, including whether they will be individual, collective or
both; (4) the order must define the harm caused to direct and indirect
victims as a result of the crimes for which the person was convicted
and identify the appropriate modalities of reparations (such as
restitution, compensation, etc.) based on the circumstances of the
case; and (5) the order must identify the victims that are eligible to
benefit from the reparations or set out the criteria for eligibility based
on the link between the harm suffered by the victims and the crimes
for which the person was convicted. 180
Unlike the earlier position of the Trial Chamber, the Appeals
Chamber clarified that “reparation orders are intrinsically linked to
the individual whose criminal liability is established in a conviction
and whose culpability for those criminal acts is determined in a
sentence.” 181 As a consequence, the Court held that a convicted
person’s liability for reparations must be proportionate to the harm
caused and his or her participation in the commission of the crimes
for which he/she was found guilty, in the specific circumstances of
the case. 182 The judgment addressed that part of the Trial Chamber
decision which seemed to open the door to reparation awards for
victims who suffered from gender and sexual-based violence, crimes
for which Lubanga had not been convicted of, but which could be
argued were proximately caused by the crime of the enlistment and
recruitment of child soldiers, for which Lubanga had been
convicted. 183
As for the identification of victims eligible to benefit from the
reparations award, the Appeals Chamber once again stressed that only
those victims who suffered harm as a result of the commission of
crimes for which Lubanga was convicted may claim reparations
180. Id. ¶ 32.
181. Id. ¶ 65.
182. Id. ¶ 6.
183. Id. ¶¶ 6, 192-99; see also Prosecutor v. Lubanga-Dylio, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842,
Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 14, 2012; Prosecutor v. Lubanga-Dylio,
ICC-01/04-01/06-3122, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his
Conviction, ¶ 117 (Dec. 1, 2014).
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against him. 184 As such, when a reparations award is made to the
benefit of a community, only members of that community who meet
the relevant criteria are eligible to benefit directly from the reparation
awarded. 185 It held that it is not proper to impose liability on Lubanga
for reparations for individuals who did not suffer harm (directly or
indirectly) that did not result from crimes for which he was found
guilty. 186 Therefore, the Appeals Chamber judgment limited the
number and type of victims that were recognized in the Trial
Chamber decision.
The Judgment embraced restraining principles, most notably
related to personal culpability, and upholds the character of the ICC
as a criminal court that may issue reparation orders linked with the
conviction of an accused. It refrains from adopting a broader
reparations mandate that would be more victim-oriented. Instead, it
leaves the broader mandate to the Trust Fund for Victims (“TFV”),
which is arguably better placed to exercise these types of functions
through its assistance mandate. This approach stands in stark contrast
to the reparations ordered by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, for example, which are largely heralded for being progressive
and inclusive. 187 One can see that the Appeals Chamber took note of
the different approach taken by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights and the context in which they operate, and decided not to
follow it. 188
A final decision on reparations has yet to be issued in the
Lubanga case; yet, the first-ever reparations decision of the ICC came
out in the Katanga case in March 2017. 189 In the Katanga reparations
decision, the Court follows the restraining principles as laid out by the
Appeals Chamber in Lubanga. While it makes numerous references to
Inter-American Court case law to support a finding that damages for
psychological harm do not have to be proven by victims or their direct
family members and to support the awarding of both collective and

184. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, ¶ 8.
185. Id.
186. Id. ¶¶ 212-14.
187. See Diana Contreras-Garduño & Sebastiaan Rombouts, Collective Reparations for
Indigenous Communities Before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 27 UTRECHT J.
OF INT’L AND EUR. L. 4 (2010).
188. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-3129, ¶¶ 128-29.
189. See generally Prosecutor v. Kataganga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Order for Reparations
pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute (March 24, 2017).
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individual reparations, 190 it does so within the scope of the Lubanga
Appeals Chamber Judgment.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE ICC? WHERE TO GO FROM HERE?
Based on the five situations presented above, it seems that the
ICC, at times, embraces ideological assumptions about human rights
and the expansive interpretation of the law without considering
fundamental, restraining principles of criminal law. This certainly
appeared to be the case in the Katanga Trial Chamber Judgment
based on Regulation 55 and the approach taken by many Chambers
regarding broad victim participation rights in proceedings. Here, the
uncritical assumptions and preferences seemed to discount a number
of restraining principles and rights, including the principles of
legality, legal certainty and fair trial considerations. These decisions
while compliant with human rights law, can be seen to be detrimental
to an accused in a criminal process. However, the Court also, at times,
rejects a conflation of the two fields of law and makes clear that its
role is one of an anti-impunity mechanism and not more.
The last three examples suggest that despite serious instances
where the two fields of law conflate to the detriment of an accused,
the Court has recognized the distinction between its role as a criminal
court and that of a human rights body. In both the asylum seekers
example and the Libya example the Court was reluctant to
substantively or structurally converge the fields of international
criminal law and human rights law. In this sense, it stuck closely to a
strict reading of the Statute, though the beneficiaries of this approach
were certainly not the individuals seeking protection under the human
rights principle of non-refoulement and international fair trial
standards respectively. In the reparations judgment the Court
refrained from adopting a victim-focused teleological reasoning and
instead stuck closely to principles of culpability and fair labelling.
Nevertheless, in this situation, it was arguably willing to do so
because it could rely on the TFV to potentially address the broader
needs of victims. In these examples, the Court showed great
reluctance of transplanting concepts from one domain to the other,
despite doing so in other situations. The situation which emerges from
this analysis is, unsurprisingly, complex.
190.

Id. ¶¶ 127, 231-32, 283.
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While the examples set out above differ in context, the last three
are less directly related to the criminal case against a specific
individual, one common thread amongst the five examples is the fact
that the Court seems to adopt or refrain from adopting a greater
human rights approach when it suits other practical considerations. In
other words, the Court is pragmatic. When it is useful to adopt a
progressive approach it does so, like when it helps to secure a
conviction (and discount alleged fair trial violations) or when it makes
victim participation assessments easier and more streamlined. When it
is not practical to adopt a human rights approach, like when state
cooperation is an issue, such as in the Libya situation or with the
asylum situation, or when there is another body to address the greater
needs of victims it will refrain from adopting a greater human rights
approach. This commonality, however, should not be exaggerated.
The approach of the Court is largely unclear and inconsistent. While
the examples addressed in this study highlight some of the more
prominent situations where human rights issues arose at the ICC,
more research needs to be done into judicial administration and
interpretation.
There is no denying that there is overlap between international
criminal law and human rights law. The ICC deals with the
prosecution of individuals accused of serious violations of human
rights (and international humanitarian law). Moreover, international
human rights standards are listed as a secondary source of applicable
law under the Statute. However, since the ICC was never designed to
operate as a human rights institution but rather as a criminal court,
obvious tensions ensue. While this distinction is important, what is
needed is a more comprehensive and transparent approach by the
judges towards such tensions in the future. To this end, prominent
academics are calling for the Court to adopt a consistent theory of
international criminal law that includes a principled interpretation of
the Rome Statute. 191 To move in any other direction would further
entrench the inconsistent approach adopted thus far. Should a future
theory of interpretation be developed and adopted, it should reflect a

191. See generally Kai Ambos, Punishment without a Sovereign? The Ius Puniendi Issue
of International Criminal Law: A First Contribution towards a Consistent Theory of
International Criminal Law, 33 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 293 (2013); Leila N. Sadat &
Jarrod M. Jolly, Seven Canons of ICC Treaty Interpretation: Making Sense of Article 25’s
Rorschach Blot, 21 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 755 (2015).
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more critical awareness of the reasoning techniques and assumptions
adopted by previous courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Whereas in a liberal system a court would be sensitive to the
importance of the restraints of the use of the State’s coercive power
against an individual, in international criminal law, prosecution and
conviction are often viewed as the fulfilment of a victim’s human
right to a remedy. 192 This sort of conceptualization emboldens the use
of human rights interpretation and application and shifts the focus of
the system from the individual culpability of an accused to one that is
more victim-focused on harms generally. If the ICC is in fact a liberal
criminal law institution, its judges will need to adhere to international
human rights standards without discounting or diminishing the
important role played by restraining principles of criminal law. After
examining a number of prominent instances arising at the Court, it
appears that the ICC is unclear about the extent of its human rights
obligations and its desired role in facilitating the interpretation of
human rights. It is largely driven by pragmatism rather than principle.
Greater clarity, through a more consistent and transparent theory of
international criminal law interpretation, is needed. In the meantime,
the judges should remain reluctant from conflating the two fields of
law, with the exception of benefiting an accused at trial, because to do
otherwise can undermine the very principles upon which fair and
legitimate criminal proceedings operate.

192. See Amann, supra note 65; see also Robinson, supra note 6.

